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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Is Summary Judgment in favor of Hood precluded by Hood's

failure to show the non-existence of material issues of fact and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law?
A.

Did Hood have the burden on its Motion for Summary

judgment to show there were no material issues of fact and that
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law?
B.

Does the record on this appeal include the facts

from the depositions referred to and set forth in the affidavit
and memoranda submitted by Salt Lake City?
C.

Does the record on this appeal establish the

existence of material

issues of fact and that Hood was not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law?
II.

Did the District Court err in refusing to reconsider

Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment?
III.

Did the District Court err in Holding Salt Lake City

to a higher standard than other litigants in this matter?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hood contends in its Brief that Salt Lake City Corporation
("SLCC") carried the burden of proving its alter ego claim and
failed

to

judgment.

satisfy

this

Established

burden

when

principles

of

Hood
law

moved

for

governing

summary
summary

judgment, however, places the burden on the party moving for
summary judgment to establish (1) the non-existence of material
issues of fact and (2) that the movant is entitled to judgment as

1

a matter of law.

Hood failed to meet these prerequisites to the

granting of summary judgment in its favor.
Hood further contends, for the first time on appeal, that
the Court

should not consider the depositions taken

in this

matter or the facts therein which were presented before the Court
and set forth in the Affidavit, (R. 153-60), and Memorandum, (R.
227-49), submitted by SLCC.

All these matters, however, were

brought to the attention of and were considered by the District
Court and are part of the record for consideration by this Court
on appeal.

Furthermore, Hood raises this issue for the first

time on appeal and has waived any objection to the consideration
of these matters by choosing not to object in the District Court.
The facts set forth and referred to in the Affidavit and
Memorandum establish many of the factors determinative of SLCC's
alter ego claim and create material factual issues precluding
summary

judgment.

involves

general

circumstances

of

Alter ego is an equitable doctrine which
standards
each

adaptable

particular

to meet

case.

the

SLCC's

facts and
submissions

establish many of the standard factors considered in weighing an
alter

ego

claim

and

require

a

trial

of

the

facts

and

circumstances of this case in order to properly dispose of this
matter.

In

conclusively

fact,

these

establish

facts

that Hood

are

so

is not

substantial
entitled

to

as

to

summary

judgment as a matter of law.
Finally, Hood contends that SLCC was properly held to higher
standards than other parties simply because it is a governmental
2

entity.

This argument is contrary to established principles and

no authority exists supportive of Hood's contention.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
HOOD'S FAILURE TO SHOW THE NON-EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL
ISSUES OF FACT AND THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS
FAVOR.
When Hood moved for Summary Judgment it had the burden of
establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact and
that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

SLCC's

Affidavit

Court,

and

Memorandum

submitted

to

the

District

however, established, through facts obtained in depositions taken
in this matter, that material issues of fact do exist and that
Hood is not entitled to judgment.

These matters submitted to the

District Court, contrary to Hood's contention raised for the
first time on appeal, are part of the record for consideration by
this Court.
A.

Hood had the Burden on its Motion for Summary Judgment to
Show there Were No Material Issues of Fact and that It Was
Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law.
Hood suggests in its brief that SLCC failed to adequately

respond to Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment and failed to make
a

showing

sufficient

Furthermore,

on page

to establish

its theory

of Alter Ego.

13 of its brief, Hood states that the

Summary Judgment should not have been reconsidered because "a
second trial at the District Court level on the same factual
issues was not warranted".

These contentions fail to recognize

the standard that a motion for summary judgment is not a "trial"
3

of

the

facts

and

that

the moving

party

has

the burden of

establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Thus, on a Motion for Summary Judgment the
movant has the burden of showing conclusively
that there exists no genuine issue of
material fact and the evidence together with
all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be
read in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.
Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2nd 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1979).
With
adequately

respect
respond

to

Hood's

to

its

Argument

Motion

for

that

SLCC

Summary

failed

Judgment,

to
the

following language of the Sixth Circuit is dispositive.
A party is never required to respond to a Motion for
Summary Judgment in order to prevail since the burden
of establishing the non-existence of a material factual
dispute always rests with the movant.
Id. at 60 (Citing Adickes v. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 157,
158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)).

As discussed in

SLCC's Brief on this appeal, Hood failed to meet this burden.
Hood's attempt to now shift this burden to SLCC is unwarranted.
B.

The Record on this Appeal Includes the Facts From the
Depositions Referred to and Set Forth in the Affidavit and
Memorandum Submitted by Salt Lake City.
In response to Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment,

SLCC

submitted an Affidavit setting forth verbatim excerpts from the
deposition of Hood's president demonstrating the existence of
material

issues

of

fact

and

that

Hood was not

judgment as a matter of law. (R. 153-160).

entitled to

SLCC also submitted,

in support of its Motion to Reconsider, a Memorandum setting
forth at length facts supportive of the alter ego claim with page
4

references to the depositions

in this matter.

(R.

227-249).

These matters were all brought to the attention of, and were
considered by, the District Court without objection from Hood.
When a memorandum sets forth facts from depositions, such
matters are properly before the court and are part of the record
on an appeal from a summary judgment.

Henderson-Rubio v. May

Department Stores Company Co. 53 Or.App. 575, 632 P.2nd 1289
(1981).

The Affidavit

set forth verbatim excerpts

from the

deposition of Hood's president supportive of the alter ego claim.
SLCC's Memorandum set forth additional extensive facts probative
of the alter ego claim with page references to depositions taken
in this matter.

All these facts were presented to the District

Court and may properly be considered by this Court in reversing
the summary judgment.

Henderson-Rubio v. May Department Stores

Company Co., 53 Or.App. 575, 632 P.2nd 1289 (1981).
Hood apparently now acknowledges that the facts set forth in
the Affidavit

and Memorandum
material

from the depositions

issues

of

fact

of Hood's

employees

raise

precluding

summary

judgment.

In order to escape the impact of these facts, Hood now

contends that this Court should not consider these depositions or
the facts presented to the District Court.

The three cases cited

by Hood in support of this position: Reliable Furniture Company
v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 380 P.2d
135 (Utah 1963); Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 384 P.2d 109
(Utah 1963); Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146 (Utah 1962), are
all distinguishable from the circumstances of the case at hand.
5

The Utah Supreme Court, referring to these three cases stated in
Bawden and Associates v. Smith. 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982):
The authorities cited by appellant on this point are
distinguishable on their facts.
They all involved
refusals by this Court to consider depositions on
appeal which were never before the trial court nor
offered to supplement the record under Rule 75(h).
Id. at 713 (Emphasis added).

In the present case, the facts from

the depositions were set forth in SLCC's Memorandum and Affidavit
and were submitted to the District Court prior to this appeal.
Equally
object

significant

is the fact that Hood chose not to

in the District Court to consideration of any of the

matters set forth in the Affidavit or Memorandum and raises these
issues for the first time on appeal.

In Franklin Financial v.

New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court held in such a case, that any defects or objection
to the consideration of such matters on appeal from a summary
judgment are waived:
In arguing that summary judgment should not have peen
granted, appellants assert that Franklin's supporting
affidavits were defective because they were not based
on personal knowledge, they contained inadmissible
conclusions of law, and they referred to documents that
were not attached.
However, it is axiomatic that
matters not presented to the trial court may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, if,
on a motion for summary judgment, an opposing party
fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is
deemed to have waived his opposition to whatever
evidentiary defects may exist.
In the instant case,
the sufficiency of Franklin's affidavits was not
challenged in the trial court, and therefore that issue
is not properly raised here.
Id.

at

1044.

Assuming,

arguendo,

that the

facts

from the

depositions were objectionable, which has been seen not to be the
6

case, Hood failed to object to the consideration of the facts set
forth in the Affidavit and Memorandum, and is deemed to have
waived any such objection.
In Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Company, Inc. 609 P.2nd
15

(Alaska 1980), the lawyer defending against a Motion for

Summary

Judgement

submitted

his

own

statements allegedly made by others.

affidavit

setting

forth

Although the affidavit

could have been excluded from consideration by the trial court,
the court on appeal held:
... it does not appear from the record that
Nabors ever specifically objected to this
affidavit, consequently the defects may be
treated as waived.
Id.22; Auto-Drive-Away Company of Hialea, Inc. v. Icce, 360 F.2nd
446, 448-49 (5th Circuit 1966).
The facts presented to the District Court in the Affidavit
and Memorandum were properly before the Court and are part of the
record on this appeal.

Hood's objection to consideration of

these matters is without basis.

Even if this were not the case,

Hood chose not to object to the consideration of these matters
and has waived any objection to such consideration.

This is

especially true when the technical defects complained of by Hood
regarding

filing

of

the

depositions

were matters

in Hood's

control since all but one of the depositions relied upon were of
Hood

employees

and

the

originals

possession of Hood's attorneys.

7

to

be

filed

were

in the

C.

The Record on this Appeal Establishes the Existence of
Material Issues of Fact and that Hood was Not Entitled to
Judgment as a Matter of Law,
As discussed in SLCC's brief on this appeal, the Affidavit

and Memorandum submitted by SLCC established the existence of
material issues of fact regarding the alter ego claim.

Hood,

however, vigorously disputes SLCC's contention that the facts,
undisputed or disputed, support SLCC's alter ego claim.

This

dispute as to the consequence and meaning of the facts in this
matter itself raises a material factual issue and precludes
summary judgment.
Herein although the parties were not in
complete conflict as to certain facts, the
understanding, intention, and consequences
of those facts were vigorously disputed.
These matters can only be resolved by trial.
Sandbera v.
contends

Cline. 576 P.2nd

that

the

matters

1291, 1292

in

the

establish its alter ego claim.

(Utah 1978).

Affidavit

and

SLCC

Memorandum

Hood disputes this conclusion.

Where the impact and consequence of the matters set forth in the
affidavit is disputed, material issues of fact exist which "can
only be resolved by trial."
In Norman v. Murray First Thrift and Loan, 596 P.2nd 1093
(Utah 1979), the court set forth the general standard for finding
Alter Ego:
There must be such unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of
the corporation and the individual no longer
exist, vis., the corporation is, in fact, the
Alter Ego of one or a few individuals; and
the observance of the corporate form would
sanction a fraud, promote an injustice, or an
inequitable result would follow.
8

Many

factors are considered

circumstances are met:

in determining whether the above

Colman v. Colman. 67 Utah Adv.Rep. 7 (Ct.

App. 1987).
SLCC's

Affidavit

set

forth

verbatim

excerpts

from

the

deposition of Hood's president establishing the existence of the
"unity of interest" discussed in Norman such as: Hood owned 100%
of the stock in James; Hood advanced substantial amounts of funds
to James which were not loans and involved no repayment terms;
Hood guaranteed substantial loans made in behalf of James, one in
the amount of $300,000.00; and the president and the financial
officer

of Hood were

intimately

financial structure of James.

involved

in determining

the

The Affidavit further set forth

matters suggesting that James was inadequately capitalized, that
James was treated as a department or division of Hood, and that
Hood did not abide by the normal corporate formalities.
In its Memorandum, SLCC set forth additional facts such as:
When Hood acquired James, it placed James Foreman, a long-time
Hood employee, as an officer of James. (James Foreman Dep., p.p.
5-6, R. 365); Foreman acted as Hood's representative while an
officer of James and was paid his salary by Hood. (Foreman Dep.,
p. 7, R. 3 65).

All these factors in the Affidavit and Memorandum

indicate that James and Hood should be treated as one, rather
than separate entities.

Fish v. East, 114 F.2nd 177, 191 (10th

Circuit 1940); Intern. U. , United Auto., etc. v. Cardwell MFG.
Co., 416 F• Supp

1267 (D. Kansas 1976) ; Cruttenden v. Mantura,

97 New Mexico 432, 640 P.2nd 932 (1982).
9

Hood also argues that there is no evidence that James does
not comply with corporate formalities.

In James Answer to SLCC1's

First Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 77, James admits
that it has kept no formal minutes of any meetings of its Board
of Directors.
The second element set forth in Norman, injustice or an
inequitable result, is also present in this case.

SLCC brings

claims against James Constructors in excess of $2,200,000.00.
SLCC is informed that James is insolvent and unable to respond to
any liability which may be imposed in this matter.

As a result,

SLCC stands to suffer a loss of more than 2.2 million dollars in
excess of what the subject pipe line project should have cost.
Such circumstances have been held to establish the injustice and
inequitable result warranting a finding of alter ego.

Bernardin,

Inc. v. Midland Oil Corporation, 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975).
It is significant to note, that the doctrine of alter ego is
not, as Hood suggests, subject to rigid standards and elements
which must be proved.

The doctrine of alter ego is an equitable

doctrine, the application of which depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
More over, the conditions under which the
corporate entity may be disregarded or the
corporation be regarded as the Alter Ego of
the stock holders vary according to the
circumstances in each case inasmuch as the
doctrine is an equitable one.
Shaw V. Bailey-McCune Company, 11 Utah2d 93, 355 P.2nd 321, 322
(1960).

Furthermore, the Court "acting in equity must be allowed

flexibility to achieve justice",
10

Ulander v. Allen, 544 P.2d

1001, 1002 (Colo. App. 1976), and

"... it is axiomatic that in

the realm of equity, no formulation is absolute and no rule is
without exception.11

Plug v. Wooldridae. 538 P.2d 883, 885 (Colo.

1975).
The question oi Alter Ego, therefore, is not susceptible to
rigid

standards

or

tests,

but

rather

depends

upon

the

determination of factual issues regarding the circumstances of
the particular case involved.

In this respect, an alter ego

claim is similar to a claim of negligence.

Just as negligence is

seldom a proper subject for summary judgment, FMA Acceptance Co.
v.

Leatherbv

Ins. Co., 594

P.2d

1332

(Utah

1979),

summary

judgment normally will not be proper on an alter ego claim.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a claim of
alter ego raises issues of fact, Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design
Associates, 635 P.2nd 53, 55 (Utah 1981), is matter upon which
reasonable minds might differ, and involves factual issues which
are within the prerogative of the court to determine through a
trial. Chatterlv v. Omnico Inc., 26 Utah2d 88, 485 P.2d 667, 670
(1971).
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECONSIDER
HOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The Affidavit

submitted to the District Court, standing

alone, established the existence

:f material issues of fact.

When SLCC's present counsel filed its Motion to Reconsider Hood's
Summary Judgment, SLCC presented to the District Court additional
facts in its Memorandum with page references to the depositions.
11

As previously discussed herein and in SLCC's Brief, these facts
established the existence of material factual issues regarding
SLCC's alter ego claim.

The District Court was not left with

unbridled discretion to arbitrarily deny reconsideration of the
matter in view of these material factual issues.
In Ottensmeyer v. Baskin, 625 P.2d 1069 (Hawaii 1981), the
party resisting a Motion for Summary Judgment failed to call to
the

court's

attention

genuine issues of fact.

portions

of

depositions

which

raised

The losing party subsequently moved for

reconsideration and specified portions of the depositions which
raised issues of facts.
On appeal, the moving party contended that the appellate
court could only consider those depositions specifically brought
to

the

court's

attention

judgment hearing.
that

at

the

time of the

first

summary

The court rejected this contention and held

it was "constrained to review the whole record on this

appeal to see whether or not genuine issues of material fact
existed." Id. at 1071.

In the present case, consideration by

this Court

of the depositions taken in this matter

compelling

since,

unlike

in

Ottensmeyer,

facts

is more

from

these

depositions were brought to the District Court's attention at the
time the Motion for Summary Judgment was first heard and again at
SLCC's Motion to Reconsider.

See also Higgenbotham v. Quchsner

Foundation Hospital, 607 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1979).

12

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING SALT LAKE CITY TO A
HIGHER STANDARD THAN OTHER LITIGANTS IN THIS MATTER.
It

is well

established

that when

governmental

entities

participate in litigation, such entities are treated the same as
any other parties in judicial proceedings.
It has been the policy of the American as well as of
the English courts to treat the government when
appearing as a litigant like any private individual.
Bank Line v. United States. 163 F.2d 133 (2nd Cir. 1947).

SLCC

has presented, in its Brief previously filed with this court,
extensive authority in support of this principal.
Hood disputes the above principle and its application in
this case to SLCC.

In its brief, Hood focuses on two of the

numerous cases cited by SLCC and argues that since they were not
factually identical to the present case, the principle of law
should

not

apply.

Although

the

cases

were

not

factually

identical to this case, they are squarely on point relative to
the legal issue involved and the principal of law enunciated.

It

is further significant to note, that Hood offers no authority
whatsoever to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
Hood had the burden of establishing the non-existence of
material issues of fact and to establish that it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Hood failed to meet this burden and

its attempt to now shift its burden to SLCC is unwarranted under
the established principles governing summary judgments.

Material

issues exist with respect to SLCC's alter ego claim and such
13

issues require a trial of the facts.

The summary judgment in

favor of Hood, therefore, was improper.
The

existence

of the

factual

issues

precluding

summary

judgment in favor of Hood were set forth in the affidavit of
SLCC's prior counsel at the time Hood's motion was first heard
and

in

SLCC's

Reconsideration.

Memorandum

in

Support

of

its

Motion

for

All these matters were properly before the

District Court and are part of the record on this appeal for
consideration by this Court.

Having failed to object in the

District Court regarding consideration of any of these matters,
Hood is deemed to have waived any objection to such consideration
and

cannot

now raise

such objections

for the first time on

appeal.
Finally, the principle that governmental entities are to be
treated and held to the same standards as any other litigants in
judicial proceedings is well established and SLCC was prejudiced
in this matter when it was held to a higher standard than its
opponents.
Dated this

\T" day of November, 1987.
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
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iDENDUM

15

ARTHUR L. KEESLER, JR. #17 81
A t t o r n e y for Third P a r t y P l a i n t i f f
S a l t Lake C i t y C o r p o r a t i o n
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
(801) 5 3 5 - 7 7 8 8
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC. ,
a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n ,
Plaintiff,

)

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

vs.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n of
t h e S t a t e of Utah,
Third P a r t y

Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . ,
a Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n , HOOD
CORPORATION, C a l i f o r n i a
c o r p o r a t i o n and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,
Third P a r t y

Defendants,

REPLY AFFIDAVIT
C i v i l No. C 8 4 - 2 8 5 7
Judge J u d i t h

Billings

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS .

County of Salt Lake)
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr. being duly sworn deposes and states
as follows:
I am the attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, the
defendant and third party plaintiff in the above consolidated
action.

Third party defendant Hood Corporation has made a Motion

for Summary Judgment based upon the fact that the third party
defendant is a separate and legal entity and not responsible for
the debts of their subsidiary corporation James Constructors,
Inc.
It is the theory of Salt Lake City Corporation in its
Complaint that James Constructors, Inc. is nothing, but the alter
ego of Hood Corporation and as such is not a separate entity and
that Hood Corporation is responsible for the breach of contract
by James Constructors, Inc.

It is a well known theory of law

that to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment there needs only to
be a question of fact for the jury.

Salt Lake City Corporation

respectfully submits that there are many questions of fact for
the jury and that the question of Hood Corporation's liability
cannot be determined on a Motion for Summary Judgment.

The

leading case which sets down the criteria as to whether a parent
corporation can be liable for a subsidiary on the basis of the
theory of alter ego \s Cruttenden v. Mantura, 640 P.2d 932.

This

case cites ten separate criteria that should be looked at by the

-2-

C\>ur t in d e t e r m i n i n g

wtiethor

a subsidiary

parent corporation.

It further

i n an a l t e r

o g o of.

g o e s on t o s a y t h a t n o t a l l

t h e s e g u i d e l i n e s must be met, but t h e s e a r e only f a c t o r s

a

of

for

the

t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r in d e t e r m i n i n g whether or not to
r e c o g n i z e a c o r p o r a t i o n as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y .

Examining

these

t e n c r i t e r i a i t would seem t h a t t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t s i x of t h e ten
which would i n d i c a t e t h a t James C o n s t r u c t o r s was n o t h i n g , taut the
a l t e r ego of Hood C o r p o r a t i o n .

The f i r s t c r i t e r i a would be "(1)

t h e p a r e n t c o r p o r a t i o n owns a l l or a m a j o r i t y of t h e c a p i t a l
s t o c k of t h e s u b s i d i a r y . "

In r e f e r r i n g to t h e d e p o s i t i o n of Mark

L a u l h e r e t h e P r e s i d e n t of Hood C r o p o r a t i o n taken on December 13,
1984 a t page 7 Mr. Laulhere was asked t h e following

question:

"And was t h i s an out and out cash purchase? Did
you p u r c h a s e a l l of i t , 100% of t h e s t o c k in W.C.
James?
"Answer:

Yes."

As can be seen from Mr. L a u l h e r e 1 s answer the f i r s t c r i t e r i a
c l e a r l y met in t h a t Hood C o r p o r a t i o n owns a l l of t h e s t o c k of
James C o n s t r u c t o r s ,

Inc.

C r i t e r i a No.(3)the parent corporation finances
subsidiary.

Page 17 of Mr. L a u l h e r e ' s

the

deposition:

" Q u e s t i o n : Has Hood C o r p o r a t i o n loaned any money
to James C o n s t r u c t o r s ?
"Answer: We have advanced funds but we h a v e n ' t
made s p e c i f i c l o a n s .
" Q u e s t i o n : Do you have any i d e a a p p r o x i m a t e l y how
much has been advanced to James?
"Answer:

No I d o n f t .
-3-

is

" Q u e s t i o n : Do you know t h e terms of t h e repayment
by James to Hood?
"Answer: We h a v e n ' t e s t a b l i s h e d any terms of
repayment."
Page 18
"Question: Are you the guarantors of any loans
that have been made to James?
"Answer: Yes,
"Question: Can you give me the approximate amount
of these loans?
"Answer: My recollection is that we have just
guaranteed one loan at First Security Bank in
Utah.
"Question:

Do you know the amount of that loan?

"Answer: Originally it was for $300,000.
sure of the exact amount.
"Question:

I'm not

And do you know what the loan was for?

"Answer: I think it was to pay off some other
loans and provide working capital."
Criteria No. (5)
capital.

The subsidiary has grossly inadequate

As can be seen from the attached Exhibit "A" the

consolidated statement of operations and return any earnings for
Hood Corporation and its subsidiaries James Constructors showed a
net loss for the year 1983 of $36r000.
Criteria No. (8)

In the papers of the parent corporation,

and in the statements of its officers the "subsidiary" is
referred to as such or as a department of the division.
As can be clearly seen from the consolidated financial
statement of Hood James Contructors is included in the
-4-

consolidated

financial

statement

and

is included

as a

suosidiary

of Hood Corporation.
Criteria No . (9)

The directors or executives of the

subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the
subsidiary but take direction from the parent corporation
referring once again to the deposition of Mark Laulhere the
president of Hood Corporation page 36 line 18 through 25.
"Question: And did you approve both of these
bonds or these requests for bonding?
"Answer:

Yes.

"Question: And do you receive periodic r e p o r t s on
those p a r t i c u l a r jobs as you did on the Salt Lake
City job.?
"Answer:

Yes.

"Question: Flow often do you receive r e p o r t s on
those jobs?
"Answer:

A monthly b a s i s .

"Question: Do you review James Constructors
financial s t r u c t u r e on a monthly b a s i s also?
"Answer:
"Question:
"Answer:

Yes.
Who does t h a t review?
I do with our chief financial

officer."

As c l e a r l y can be seen James Constructors finances along with
t h e i r jobs are c l o s e l y monitored and directed by the o f f i c e r s of
Hood Corporation, the parent corporation.
C r i t e r i a No. (10)

The formal legal requirements of the

subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not
observed.

Once again r e f e r r i n g to Mr. Laulhere's deposition
-5-

pages

38 and

39:

"Question:
"Answer:

"Question:
"Answer:
"Question:
"Answer:

Who performs the audit of James books?
Ernest and Whitney.

The same auditors t h a t do yours?
Yes.
And t h a t ' s a consolidated

audit?

Yes.

As c l e a r l y can be seen James audit i s done by the parent
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s a u d i t o r s as part of the parent c o r p o r a t i o n ' s
consolidated audit and i t i s not an independent and s e p a r a t e
audit.
I t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y submitted t h a t James Constructors Inc.
was purchased by Hood Corporation solely to have a non-union
company to do business in the S t a t e of Utah and i s t o t a l l y
c o n t r o l l e d by Hood Corporation.

As such i t i s a question of fact

for the jury to determine at the t r i a l of t h i s action whether or
not Hood Corporation i s responsible for the debts and breach of
c o n t r a c t of James Constructors and t h a t t h i s motion cannot be
decided simply on the a f f i d a v i t of Mr. Laulhere which i s t o t a l l y
contradicted by h i s sworn testimony in the d e p o s i t i o n .
DATED t h i s

30

day of July 198 5.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this g f ^

day of July,

1985.

N0TAT*7 PUBLIC, r e s i d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
MyiGompti-ssion
a\'-

in

Expires

':fe^7K
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby c e r t i f y

Affidavit

that

I m a i l e d a copy of t h e

foregoing

Reply

t o David A. R e e v e , ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST, 1300

Walker C e n t e r ,

S a l t Lake C i t y ,

Utah 84111 and t o C. Reed Brown,

4685 S o u t h H i g h l a n d D r i v e , S u i t e 2 0 2 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 7 ,
by d e p o s i t i n g t h e same i n t h e U . S . m a i l , p o s t a g e
this J ^ ^ - d a y

of J u l y ,

1985.

ccll7

7-

prepaid,

WILFORD A. BEESLEY #0257
STANFORD P. FITTS #4834
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Salt Lake City
Corporat ion
310 Deseret Book Building
4 0 Easr South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION'S MOTION TC
RECONSIDER AND FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND
COMPLAINT.

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of the
State of Utah,

Civil No. C-84-2857

Plaintiff,

Judge Judith Billings

vs,
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC. ,
a Nevada corporation; HOOD
CORPORATION, a California
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a
California corporation,
Defendants.

Salt Lake City Corporation, (SLCC) hereby submits its
1

Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Reconsider and for Leave
to Amend Complaint.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff desires to bring to the attention of the Court the
following undisputed facts, paragraphs 7 - 2 0

herein, which were

net before the Court at the time the Court heard defendant Hood
Corporation's

Motion for Summary Judgment, which facts establish

that Hood Corporation is the alter ego of James Constructors and
is a proper party to this action.
1.

This law suit was commenced on or about May 15, 193 4

and arose out of a Construction Contract between the parties
for the construction of a water pipe line for SLCC, known as the
Big

Cottonwood

Conduit

Extension

Terminal/Park

Transmission

Pipeline, Project No. 35-4148.
2.

This matter was originally handled for SLCC by Arthur

Keesler, Esq., of the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office.
of

1986, however, SLCC turned

In March

the case over to Wilford A.

Beesley, Esq., of the law firm of Beesley, Spencer & Fairclough.
3.

SLCC

named

defendant

Hood

Corporation

(at

times

hereinafter referred to as Hood) as a defendant in its Complaint
stating as a cause of action that SLCC awarded the construction
job to James Constructors, (at times hereinafter referred to as

2

James) in reliance upon information submitted in the form of Hcod
Corporation's promotional literature.
4.

Hood Corporation made a Motion for Summary Judgement

requesting a dismissal of SLCC's claim of reliance.

Summary

Judgment was granted by the Court.
5.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to

the Court by counsel for Hoed stated that the Summary Judgment
was granted on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show a
substantial issue of fact with regard to an alter ego theory of
liability.
6.

The Alter Ego theory, however, is not in SLCC's original

Complaint and was not before the Court. SLCCfs original Complaint
based its claim of liability on the part of Hood upon reliance/
estoppel rather than on an alter ego theory.

The Memorandum

submitted on behalf of Hood, in fact, does not even address the
alter ego theory.

No Memorandum was submitted by prior counsel

on behalf of SLCC.

FACTS

SLCC relies upon the following facts in support of its
motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint:
7.

Hood owns 100% of the stock of James Constructors.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 7).

3

8.

Hoed

placed

James

Foreman,

one

of

its

long time

employees, with James Constructors1 predecessor, W.C. James, as
General Manager and Vice-President prior to Hood's acquisition of
100% of the stock in said entity.

During this period of time

when James Foreman served as Vice-President and General Manager
of W.C, James, James Foreman was an employee and representative
of Hood.
9.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 11; Foreman Dep. p. 7).
When

Hood

acquired

100%

of

the

stock

of

James

Constructors, it placed James Foreman as President of
James.

Hood

admitted that this action may have been taken

directly by Hood's Board of Directors. (Laulhere Dep., p. 12).
10.

Hood advanced funds to James without any repayment

provisions or security.

These advances of funds were not loans.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 17).
11.

Hood has guaranteed loans made by third-parties to

James, including one in an approximate amount of $300,000.00 from
First Security Bank.
12.

(Laulhere Dep., p. 13).

No security was ever provided by James for money

advanced or the loans guaranteed by Hood. (Laulhere Dep., p. 34).
13.

James Foreman was an employee of Hood for several

years prior to his placement with James Constructors by Hood
(James Foreman Dep., pp. 5-6).
14.

When Hood placed James Foreman with James, James

Foreman did not sever his ties with Hood but rather was acting as

4

the

representative of Hood and was paid his salary by Hood.

(Foreman Dep., p. 7) .

15.

James Foreman provided Hood promotion literature to

Salt Lake City Corporation in order to aid SLCC in determining
whether or net to award the pipeline project to James.
16.

Since Industrial Indemnity was Hood's bonding

company, it was also the bonding company of James
Constructors.
17.

(Foreman Dep., p. 10).

Industrial

Indemnity, when bonding James1 projects,

relied upon Hood and did not ask for financial statements from
James

Constructors

Hood.

relied

upon the

financial

position of

(Foreman Dep., p. 18).
18.

was

and

to

Industrial Indemnity's arrangement, in bonding James
consider

the

financial

position

of

Hood

and

its

subsidiaries as one single account. (Ken Evans Dep., pp.14, 15 &
32) .
19.
signed

The President of Hood Corporation, Marc Laulhere,

the

Indemnity

Contract

of James

Constructors'

predecessor, W.C. James, as President of Hood.

(Evans Dep., p.

18) .
20.

When a claim arose against James Constructors by

Staker Paving on the Salt Lake City Pipe Line Project, James1
bonding company, Industrial Indemnity, dealt directly with Marc

5

Laulhere, Presidenr of Hoed Corporation rather than with the
officers or personnel of James.

(Evans Dep., p. 23).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT IS PRESENT IN THIS MATTER AS TO
WHETHER HOOD IS THE ALTER EGO OF JAMES CONSTRUCTORS.
Notwithstanding the fact that the original pleadings contain
no reference to the alter ego theory against hood, Rule 56 (c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precludes Summary Judgement en
such a claim where there exists a genuine issue of fact.
We are of the opinion that there was an issue raised by
the pleadings and the counter affidavit of the
defendant in opposition to the plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and that the defendant is entitled to
have its day in Court. . .Rule 56, U.R.C.P., should not
be used where there are issues of fact in dispute.
Hatch v. Suaarhouse Finance Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d
758, 759 (1967).
The facts obtained in the discovery of this matter and which
were not before the Court at the hearing of Hood's Motion for
Summary Judgment, make it "clear that issues of fact are raised
by the claim
Associates,

[of Alter Ego]." Amiacs Interest, Inc. v.Design

635 P.2d

53

(Utah 1983).

This is particularly

evident in view of the nature of the alter ego doctrine.
Moreover, the conditions under which the corporate
entity may be disregarded or the corporation be
6

regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders vary
according to the circumstances in each case inasmuch as
the doctrine is an equitable one...
Shaw v. Bailev-McCune Company, 11 Utah 2d 93, 355 P.2d 321, 322
(1960).
The

determination

of

the

alter

ego

issue, therefore,

necessarily requires findings of fact in order to determine if
the circumstances of the particular case warrant a finding of
altar ego.

Such evidentiary

findings of facts in dispute,

however, are not a proper subject for disposition through summary
judgment.
[I]n a morion for Summary Judgment, the judge is
neither required nor permitted to find facts which are
in issue, he can only find that there are no issues of
fact to be found and that one party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 464 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah
1970).

Given the equitable and factual nature of an

alter ego claim, it is apparent that such a claim can
properly be resolved only through findings of fact after an
evidentiary hearing or trial and normally is not a proper
subject for summary Judgment.
It further appears that the question of alter ego itself is
an issue of fact and is not properly disposed of through summary
judgment unless the undisputed facts clearly establish the claim.
In Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assoc, 635 P. 2d 53 (Utah
1981), the Utah Supreme Court considered the appeal of a summary
judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action.
7

In holding that the

summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's alter ego claim was not
proper, the Court stated:
The District Court made no mention of plaintiff's
alter-ego claim in its order of dismissal, but it is
clear that issues of fact are raised bv the claim.
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
In Plotkin v. National Lead Company, 432 P.2d 323 (Nevada
1971), the court found that a claim of alter ego presented a
genuine issue of fact and that summary judgment was improper. In
that case, the court reversed the granting of summary judgment
based upon alter ego.
POINT II
HOOD FAILED TO MAKE THE REQUIRED SHOWING THAT IT WAS
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Summary judgement is only proper where the party who is
granted the summary judgment has made "a showing which precludes,
as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the losing
party."

Tanner v. Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative, 11 Utah

2d 353, 359 P.2d 18, 19 (1961).

Hood must "clearly" show tha~

"there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against
could prevail."

Frisbe v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 337,

3 89 (Utah 1984).

Hood Corporation has not even attempted to make

such

with

a

showing

regard

to

the

alter

ego

theory.

The

Memorandum submitted by Hood Corporation does not mention in any
way or form the theory of alter ego.
Furthermore,

Hood's

only

attempt

8

to

make

the

required

showing that it was entitled to judgment was the affidavit of
Marc Laulhere.
Hood

This affidavit, however, merely states that

Corporation

Constructors.
summary

was

a

separate

corporation

from

James

Such an affidavit is insufficient for purposes of

judgment

and

should

conclusory and self serving.

be

disregarded

by

the

Court

as

Webster v. Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170

(Utah 1983); Orion Coro v. State, 693 P.2d

1369 (Wash. 1985);

Searnster v. Rumuh, 698 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1985); Vail Nat. Bank v. J.
Wheeler Constr. Cort?, 669 P.2d 1038 (Colo.App. 1983).

Finally,

the

officers,

facts

obtained < in

the

depositions

of

Hood's

including Marc Laulhere, and others contradict and dispute the
statement in the affidavit of Marc Laulhere submitted on behalf
of Hood Corporation.
In Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the
Utah Supreme Court discussed the purpose of summary judgement and
the conditions under which it may properly be granted.
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure
to judge the credibility of the averments of parties,
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it
to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate
the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled
against, he would not be entitled to prevail.
Only
when it so appears, is the Court justified in refusing
such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence
in attempting to persuade the trier to his views.
Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any
issue,material to the settlement of the controversy,
the Summary Judgement should not be granted.
Id. at 193.
9

Hood clearly has not satisfied the above standard. First of
all, the sworn statements in Mark Laulhere's deposition conflict
with and create a genuine and material issue of fact with regard
to the statements in his affidavit. More importantly, however,
the facts obtained in discovery of this matter preponderate so
favorably towards

a finding of alter ego, particularly when

viewed in a light most favorable to Salt Lake City Corporation,
that Summary Judgement cannot properly be granted in favor of
Hood.

As will be discussed below, these undisputed facts are so

substantial that summary judgment would be more properly granted
against Hood on the theory of alter ego.

It should be pointed

out, however, that the facts discussed below with regard to the
altar ego theory were not brought to the attention of the Court
at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment.

POINT III
THE FACTS OBTAINED IN DISCOVERY OF THIS MATTER AND
WHICH WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AT THE HEARING OF
HOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT INDICATE THAT HOOD
CORPORATION WAS THE ALTER EGO OF JAMES CONSTRUCTORS AND
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN FAVOR OF HOOD WAS IMPROPER.
The facts obtained in the discovery if this matter as of the
date of this Motion not only create genuine issues of fact
regarding the alter ego theory, they also yield such substantial
and undisputed facts on this point that summary judgment would be
more properly granted in favor of Salt Lake City Corporation on
the issue of alter ego.
10

A.

The Alter Ego Doctrine,
The Doctrine of alter ego may be used in appropriate

circumstances where stockholders of a corporation use the
corporation

as a shield to avoid debts or other obligations.

Docksteader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (1973).

The

Utah Supreme Courr discussed the requirements of the alter ego
doctrine in Norman v Murray First Thrift and Loan Company, 59 6
P.2d 1023 (Utah 1979).
In order to disregard the corporate entity,there must
be a concurrence of circumstances: (1) There must be
such unity of interest in ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist, vis., the corporation is, in fact, the
alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the
observance of corporate form would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice or inequitable result would follow.

Id. at 1030; See also Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., 800 F.2d 853,
859

(9th Cir. 1986) .

Furthermore, the Courts will look beyond

the corporate veil where the corporate entity is used to defeat
justice or where the corporate entity is "but a sham11 and it is
the

stockholder

shield.

who

is

doing

business

behind

the

corporate

Docksteader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 528

(1973).
Furthermore, the use of the corporate veil to avoid legal
obligations is not favored, Jory v. Benniqht, 542 P.2d 1400
(Nevada 1978)(citing Banaor Punta Operations v.Bangor A.R.
Company, 417 U.S. 703 (1974)), and a court of equity will give
greater deference to the substance rather than the form of an
11

entity.
P.2d 1094

Decker v. Berean Baptist Church, 51 Or.App. 191, 624
(1981); Linson v. Linson. 1 Hawaii Ct. App. 272, 613

P.2d 748 (1980); Carol v. Board of Education Trustees, 593 P„2d
649 (Arizona 1979) .
A Court of Equity looking beyond the mere form of
things to their substance, has power to decree such
relief to the parties as appears just and right, and is
best calculated to protect their rights under the
situation presented by the record.
Sinclair Oil and Gas Ccmoanv v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436, 448 (Okla.
1967).

The undisputed facts in this matter strongly indicate

that James was not a separate entity

independent of Hood but

rather was the alter ego of Hood and that, therefore, summary
judgment in favor of Hood was improper.

B.

Unity of Identity and Lack of Seoarateness of Hood and James.

In Steven Roscoe Turner Aeronautical

Corp., 324 F.2d

157

(7th Cir. 1963) , The Court outlined several relevant factors in
determining whether the doctrine of alter ego is applicable in
any particular case.

Among the factors enumerated are several

factors which have been established in this case:
(a) The parent owns all or most of the capital stock of
the subsidiary...
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary...
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the
capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise its
incorporation...
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other
expenses or losses of the subsidiary...
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do
12

not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary
but take their orders from the parent corporation in
the latterfs interest.
Id. at 161•

Among these factors are several which have been

established by the discovery in this matterWhen

James

Constructors

Industrial

Indemnity,

Industrial

Indemnity

for
had

dealt with

bonding

on

its

bonding

construction

company,
projects,

only

one account covering both Hood

Company and James Constructors.

(Evans Dep. pp., 14, 15, & 32).

Hood and James were considered by Industrial Indemnity to
be one single account.

(Evans Dep. pp., 14, 15, & 32).

In fact, when handling the bonding for James Constructors, the
financial position of James Constructors was not considered
by

Industrial

Indemnity

position of Hood.

but

rather

only

the

financial

(Evans Dep., pp. 14, 15 & 32; Foreman Dep., p.

18) .
Furthermore

the

bonding

documents

for

James

and

its

predecessors were signed by Marc Laulhere as President of Hood.
(Evans Dep., p. 18). When James Foreman was asked why Industrial
Indemnity Company was chosen for James Constructors he stated
that Industrial was James Constructors bonding company because
that is who bonded Hood.

(Foreman Dep., p. 10).

The unity of interest and lack of separateness of Hood and
James's is further evidenced by their operations.

In 1983, Hood

placed one of its long time employees, James Foreman with
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James Constructors' predecessor.

(Foreman Dep., pp. 5 & 7).

For

a period of approximately one year, James Foreman acted as the
General Manager and Vice-President of the predecessor of James
Constructors.

(Foreman Dep., p. 7). When Foreman was placed by

Hoed with James he was the representative of Hood and did not
sever his ties with Hood and Hoed paid his salary.
Dep.,

p.

7). Hood

acquired

100%

of

the

stock

(Foreman
in

James

Constructors1 predecessor, changed the name to James Constructors
and placed James Foreman as President. (Laulhere Dep., p. 12).
When bidding for the SLCC project, James Foreman supplied Hood
promotion literature' to Salt Lake City Corporation in order to
induce SLCC to award the pipeline project to James Constructors.
The

financial

dealings

evidences a unity of identity.

between

Hoed

and

James

further

Hood guaranteed large loans taken

out by James Constructors, one of which was in the amount of
$300,000.00 from First Security Bank. (Laulhere Dep., p. 18). No
security or protection was given to Hood on this guarantee.
(Laulhere Dep., p. 34). In effect, Hood and James acted as one
in taking out this loan.
Additionally, Hoed advanced funds to James which were not
loans. (Laulhere Dep., p. 17). These funds were merely given to
James

without

any

pay-back

(Laulhere Dep., p. 17).

requirement

or

security

given.

These transactions amount to nothing

more than dealings of one entity with respect to its own funds
transferred from one account to another of the single entity.
14

The lacJc of separateness and unity of identity of Hood and
James is a7 Q ^
^so apparent from the manner in which disputes of
Const-T,~+.

James

UCwQrs vere

bandied, when a dispute on the Salt
•^ciJce ci **Pl?S
Line
.
Pr°Uct
arose between James and staJcer
p
aVZng
the
'
bonding company, Industrial Indemnity, dealt with
Ware Laulhe>-e
^
- , tne President of Hood rather than with the
PerSCnnel
B a r n e s . (Evans Dep., p. 22) .
Seed's ownership of 100% of the stocJc in James Constructor
*s suhsid^ina *„<* *•
*xng and financing of James Constructors, James
constructor'^ i«»^
nadeguate
capitalization, and Hood's payment of
tie
salary of TJ ,a m e s F
°reman while acting as Vice-President
anager of James Constructors predecessor are all
f
Hood

s supporting a conclusion that James was Hood's alter ego.
These facts al
* •
S
° l n d l c a t e and raise and inference that the
or executives of James Constructors do not act
ndependentl
_
le lnte
,,
r e s t of James Constructors but taJce
their orders f m
Hood which
would further indicate that Hood is
t
alter ego C f James Constructors.
1

"Ti^rg^-^fe^g-.of Hood and JaniPs as Separate Entities Would
^ust2i
agfflutable Rpg„if ^ n d D e f e a t t h e I n t e r e s t s of

econd factor in the alter ego theory as set forth by
he Utah <?
Preme Court in Norman v Murray First Thrift and Loan
^S2any,

596

p

•2d 1028 (Utah 1979), that the recognition of
•Parate entit'
ies would yield an inequitable result, is also
15

present in this case.

Hood acquired James to do business in the

State of Utah behind the corporate shield of James Constructors.
As discussed

above, Hood ran and operated James Constructors

through its own officers and by placing its own personnel in
supervisory

and

management

positions.

Hood

maintained

and

financed James through guaranteeing loans and supplying cash at
an

undercapitalized

liabilities.

level

with

equity

of

only

25%

of

its

(Foreman Dep., p. 13). When James Constructors bid

for the Salt Lake City Pipe Line Project, the required bond on
the project of $1.2 million dollars was essentially obtained by
Hoed Construction.
SLCC now brings claims against the parties for damages in
excess of 2 million dollars.

Given the capitalization level at

which Hood maintained James, it is unlikely that it would be able
to satisfy any judgment against it.

It would be inequitable to

allow Hood to escape the liability for what are essentially its
own dealings and obligations by hiding behind the guise of James
Constructors.

Hood Construction should be held to be the alter

ego of James Constructors and should be held liable for any
liabilities arising out of Salt Lake City's claims where it was
really Hood "who is doing business behind the corporate shield'1
of James Constructors.

Docksteader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370,

510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973).
In

view

respectfully

of

the

above,

Salt

Lake

City

Corporation

submits that there exist several material facts
16

supporting a finding that Hood Construction is the alter ego of
James

Constructors.

The mere statement

in Marc Laulhere's

affidavit is clearly insufficient in view of these facts to
constitute the required showing that "when upon any view taken of
the facts as asserted by [Salt Lake City Corporation, that it]
would not be entitled to prevail." Holbrook Company v.Adams, 542
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).
In Frisbe v. K&K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984),
the Court stated:
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that summary Judgment is proper only where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. It should be granted only when it clearly appears
that there is no reasonable probability that the party
moved against could prevail.
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the opposing party.
Id. at 389 (emphasis added).

In view of the undisputed facts now

before the Court, there is certainly at least a "reasonable
probability" that SLCC may prevail on its alter ego claim if
afforded its day in court to present such claim to the jury.
This is particularly so since additional facts bearing on this
issue are sought by SLCC through discovery, the answers and
responses to which, as of the date of this Memorandum, have not
yet been received by SLCC and are long overdue.
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POINT IV
THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO MODIFY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PREVIOUSLY GRANTED IN THIS CASE IN FAVOR OF HOOD
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that :
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action
whether
it was
a claim,
counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim and/or when multiple
parties are involved the court may direct entry of
final judgement as to one or more but fewer than all
the claims or parties only upon an expressed
determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of Summary Judgment.
In the absence of such a
determination and direction any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate that
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of the
parties.
(Emphasis added).

In this case there are multiple parties and

summary judgment has been granted in the favor of only one of
those parties.

The last sentence of the above Rule of Civil

Procedure makes clear that the Order granting Summary Judgment in
favor of Hood Construction is subject to revision or modification
by this Court at any time before final judgment is entered with
regard to all parties and all claims in the above entitled
action.

See also Johnson v.Johnson, 674 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1983).

In Klowser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 522 P.2d 1360 (Wyo. 1974),
the defendant was granted summary judgment on the question of
18

whether it was per se liable under the facts of that case.

in

considering the legal affect of the judgment, the Wyoming Supreme
Court

explained

that

a decision upon

a Motion

for Summary

Judgment can be revised by the trial court at any time pending
trial because it was not a true final order. See also, Barnett v.
Cal M, Inc., 445 P.2d 974 (N.M.1968).
Rule 54

(b) , U.R.C.P., provides for reconsideration and

reserves in the Court, the power and authority to revise any
Orders by it in a matter prior to a final decision and Order
disposing of all parties and all claims.

Once the matter is

brought to the Court's attention, the above Rule and authorities
clearly show that the Court may reconsider, revise or modify the
Order.

POINT V
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION SHOULD BE GRANTED LEAVE TO
AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO NAME HOOD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
AS A DEFENDANT AND TO PROPERLY PLEAD THE ALTER EGO
THEORY.
A.

Leave to Amend Should Be Granted in the Interests of Justice.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party may amend its pleading with leave of the Court and that
"leave shall be freely given when justice so requires". The
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "....Rule 15 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure tends to favor the granting of leave
1Q

to amend..."

Westlev v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93,

94 (Utah 1983).

In view of the facts discussed above in this

Memorandum, it appears that justice would require leave to amend
SLCC's Complaint to plead the alter ego theory and name Hood a
defendant.
Hood was originally named as a defendant in the Salt Lake
City Complaint from the date it was first filed although Hood was
granted

Summary

Judgement.

The

above

discussion

in

this

Memorandum, however, which was not presented to the Court at the
time of the Motion of Summary Judgment indicates that the Summary
Judgment granted should be revised and that Hoed should remain in
this law suit to allow SLCC to present its evidence at the trial
of this matter with regard to the alter ego theory.
It is important to point out that this is not a new cause of
action and Hood is, in reality, not a new party
although
attorneys

it presently
remain

on

is

not

active

the mailing

in the

list

to the matter
suit.

Hood's

of all pleadings and

documents in this case and is not an unrelated party due to its
unity of identity with James Constructors.

B.

Hood is a Necessary Party Requiring Joinder in This Case.

As the alter ego of James Constructors, Kcod is a necessary
party

requiring

joinder

under

Rule

19

which

requires

that

"persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be
20

joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants."

In view of

the facts indicating the unity of identity and interest of Hood
and James, leave to amend and join Hood should be granted to
insure that all necessary parties are in this law suit.
In

the Utah Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the

rule requiring joinder as a condition to suit is to guard against
the entry of judgments that might prejudice the rights of such
parties in their absence and to foster judicial economy through
preventing multiple litigation.

Kemp v. Murray, 680 P. 2d 758

(Utah 1984); San Pete County, etc. v. Price River etc., 652 P. 2d
1302, 1306 (Utah 1982).

Hoed will certainly be affected by any

judgment against James Constructors due to its unity identity
with James and further due to the fact that James Constructors
bonding was secured by Hood.

Furthermore, if Hood is not joined

in this law suit then there exists the possibility of additional
law suits against Hood for any judgment rendered against James in
this action.
In order to comply with the provisions of Rules 15 and 19 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Salt Lake City Corporation
should be granted leave to amend its Complaint to join Hood and
to plead the theory of alter ego.
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CONCLUSION

The undisputed facts now before the Court and which were not
presented to the Court at the time of the Motion of Summary
Judgment, when viewed in a light most favorable to Salt Lake City
Corporation, support a cause of action against Kood on the alter
ego theory.

It certainly

cannot be said that there is no

reasonable probability that Salt Lake City Corporation could not,
under any view of the facts, prevail on its claim of alter ego.
At the very least, these facts create a genuine and substantial
disputed issue of fact with regard to the issue of alter ego. In
view of these facts which were not before the Court when this
Motion was heard, the Summary Judgment should be withdrawn and
Salt Lake City Corporation should be afforded

its day in Court

to present its evidence on the issue of alter ego to the jury.
If Salt Lake City Corporation is not allowed to have its day
in Court on the issue of alter ego, a great injustice will result
inasmuch as Hood Corporation will be allowed to escape Salt Lake
City's claims in excess of $ 2 million through its operations in
the

State

of

Constructors.
shield.

Utah

under

the

guise

and

shield

of

James

The law does not favor such use of a corporate

Salt Lake City Corporation respectfully requests that

this Court act within its authority in withdrawing the Summary
Judgment which has been granted and further to grant Salt Lake
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City Corporation leave to amend its complaint to rejoin Hood and
to plead the alter ego theory.
Dated this

grTday of December, 1986.
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH

1

Wilford A. Beesley

Pv^^k.

Stanford P. Fitts
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